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this is a small percentage by U.S. standards, our study suggests
that patent trolling might not be as uniquely American as
conventional wisdom suggests. We also find little support for
many common explanations for Europe’s relative scarcity of NPE
activity. For example, we find that NPEs litigating in the U.K.
overwhelmingly assert high-tech patents—even more so, in fact,
than their U.S. counterparts—despite higher barriers to software
patentability in Europe. Our study does, however, tend to support
fee-shifting as a key reason for the U.K.’s immunity to NPEs. We
see evidence that the U.K.’s loser-pays legal regime deters NPEs
from filing suit, while at the same time encouraging accused
infringers to defend claims filed against them. U.K. NPE suits are
initiated by potential infringers more often than by NPEs; rarely
end in settlement; very rarely end in victory for NPEs; and, thus,
result in an attorney’s fee award to the potential infringer more
often than a damages award or settlement payment to the patentee.
Together, these findings tend to support patent reform bills
pending in the U.S. that would implement a fee-shifting regime for
patent suits, and may also serve to lessen concerns that Europe’s
forthcoming Unified Patent Court will draw NPEs to Europe.
INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom states that “patent trolls”—entities that
obtain patents not to facilitate the development of new products,
but instead for the purposes of suing those who do—are a uniquely
American phenomenon.1 As the story goes, patent monetization is
1

See, e.g., Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patents Enforcement: A Comparative
Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the US and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 105), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156756 (“[P]atent trolls were believed to be almost exclusively
confined within US borders . . . . European countries appeared to be immune to the
activity of NPEs.”); Anna Mayergoyz, Note, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S.
Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 244 (2009) (“Europe has remained relatively
unscathed by patent trolls.”). European policymakers, in particular, have been quick to
characterize “patent trolls” as a problem unique to America and absent in Europe. See
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee, at 6, COM (2008) 465 final (July 16, 2008)
(“The quality of patents in Europe is generally perceived to be high. Nevertheless,
stakeholders are concerned about maintaining and improving patent quality in
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rarely pursued in Europe due to some combination of higher
barriers to patenting software,2 steeper cost of enforcement,3
Europe . . . . [because] [p]oor quality rights can also contribute to problems with ‘patent
trolls’ that have arisen in the US judicial system”); Comments by Nuno Pires de
Carvalho, Director, Intellectual Prop. & Competition Policy Div., World Intellectual
Prop. Org (WIPO), Comments on PAEs’ Activities (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0007.pdf
(“PAEsenforcers are a problem, if they can be deemed so, in the United States only . . . .
[O]utside the United States to buy and hold patents with the mere purpose of enforcing
them is not a financially wise decision.”); Gail Edmondson, European Patent Office
Enters New Era: Managing the EU Unitary Patent, SCIENCE BUSINESS (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/76068/European-Patent-Office-enters-new-eramanaging-the-EU-Unitary-Patent (“‘I think patent trolls are linked to . . . injunction
powers in the US legal system . . . . If we find a good balance between the interest of the
patent holders and the interest of third parties—which is the basis of the European
system—I am convinced we will have balanced and appropriate decisions.’” (quoting
Benoît Battistelli, European Patent Office President)).
2
See, e.g., Peter Leung, Will We See Globe-Trotting Patent Trolls Anytime Soon?,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. BLOG (June 20, 2013), http://www.managingip.com/Blog/
3221150/Will-we-see-globe-trotting-patent-trolls-any-time-soon.html (“In Europe, NPEs
are still less active than in the US, perhaps due to key differences such as the
unavailability of software and business method patents . . . .”). In the U.S., software has
been generally patentable since at least 1998. See State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
In Europe, the situation is more complex. Article 52 of the European Patent Convention
expressly excludes from the scope of patentable subject matter “schemes, rules and
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for
computers.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention (EPC)]. However, as applied by
the European Patent Office and U.K. courts, this provision only prohibits patenting
software-based inventions that are “solely” computer algorithms and, thus, do not make a
“technical” contribution to a non-excluded field. See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd.,
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, ¶ 40, [2007] 1 All E.R. 225 (A.C.) (Eng.) (holding that the
relevant inquiry is whether the invention’s “contribution [is] solely of excluded matter”
or, in other words, “whether the contribution is ‘technical’”); Case T0208/84, VICOM
Systems Inc., 1987 O.J. E.P.O., ¶¶ 14–23. This interpretation has proven to be so narrow
that some commentators believe it has, for all intents and purposes, rendered Article 52 a
dead letter. See Patrick E. King et al., The Confluence of European Activism and
American Minimalism: “Patentable Subject Matter” after Bilski, 27 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 247, 255 (2011) (“Over the last twenty years, the EPO has
effectively read the restriction against ‘programs for computers’ out of Article 52(2) in its
struggle to find a test that affords the appropriate protection to inventions in the computer
age.”).
3
See, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 268–70 (“One . . . explanation for the lack of
patent trolls in Europe relative to the United States is the European patent enforcement
system as a whole; that is, complex and varying national laws may in themselves scare
away the patent trolls.”). In the U.S., a patent can be enforced nationwide in one district
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cheaper cost of defense,4 smaller damages awards,5 differing
cultures,6 and more frequent attorney’s fee awards.7
court. See, e.g., Charlene Morrow & Sara Jenkins, Legal FAQ: Introduction to Patent
Litigation, FENWICK & WEST LLP, http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/
Legal_FAQ_Patent_Litigation.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (“A patent infringement
case can be filed in any district in the United States that has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant . . . .”). A patent can also be enforced for little or no up-front out-of-pocket
expense due to the use of contingency fee representation. See generally David L.
Schwartz, The Rise of Contingency Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 335 (2012). Under the EPC—at least for the time being, see infra notes 9–10
(describing proposals to create a Unified Patent Court)—patents are national rights that
can only be enforced within the bounds of each member nation. See, e.g., TERENCE
PRIME, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 176, 195 (2000). As a result,
widespread patent enforcement in Europe generally requires parallel litigation in multiple
countries. On a per capita basis, a patentee would have to sue in at least five European
countries to match the jurisdictional reach of one patent suit in the U.S. See, e.g.,
Population (Total), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
(last visited July 17, 2013) (showing that the U.S. population is roughly 314 million,
approximately equal to that of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. combined).
In addition, most European nations, including the U.K., prohibit contingency fee
litigation. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement
Delay and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J. L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 517, 518 (2003) (“In Europe, contingency fees typically are
illegal or unenforceable . . . .”). Accordingly, a patentee deciding whether to file suit
must consider whether it can afford to pay hourly attorney’s fees up-front pending the
outcome of the case and whether it can afford to lose those funds altogether should it lose
the case. Cf. Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and
Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 307 (1999).
4
See, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 260 (noting that U.S. patent trolls can “extract
exorbitant licensing agreements” from their targets due to “two intertwined hurdles—the
overwhelming cost of litigation and a high standard for proving patent invalidity,” both of
which are less onerous in Europe). Patent litigation is generally less expensive in Europe
than it is in the U.S; the median cost of defending a U.S. patent case is about $2.5
million. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 at I-155-56 (reporting median litigation costs of $2.5 million
among survey respondents involved in mid-sized patent suits, i.e., those with between $1
million and $25 million at stake). In Europe, litigation costs about €100,000 to €400,000,
or about $130,000 to $525,000, per party. Nicolas van Zeebroeck & Stuart Graham,
Comparing Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look 5 n.4 (Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924124&download=
yes. Potential infringers in Europe also have access to stronger, cheaper, and faster
administrative alternatives to litigation. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff,
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1002–1007 (2004); Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 260–63.
5
See, e.g., Fusco, supra note 1, at 120 (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Global Perspectives
on Patent Law, (July 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“The most
common explanations in the literature for the reduced presence of NPEs in Europe rely
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Despite the common refrain, few scholars have studied patent
troll litigation outside the U.S. and, as a result, little empirical
evidence supports these frequent claims. The lack of data on
Europe’s experience with trolls is especially surprising today
because those findings are now more relevant than ever in both the
U.S. and Europe. In the U.S., patent reform efforts targeting trolls
are well underway. Over roughly the last year, twelve separate
bills have been introduced, many proposing the adoption (or
expansion) of procedures long thought to be “troll-killers” in
Europe.8
on differences in the US and EU legal systems; in particular, they point to the availability
of certain injunctions as well as the different level of damages awarded in patent cases.”).
The median damages award in a U.S. patent case between 1995 and 2010 was about $5.1
million, substantially higher than the average in Europe. See Chris Barry et al., 2011
Patent Litigation Study, PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPER 9, http://www.pwc.com/en_US
/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2011-patent-litigation-study.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014); Zeebroeck & Graham, supra note 4, at 5 n.5 (noting, for example, that the
average patent infringement award in France was just over €21,000, roughly $28,000, in
1998); see also THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 287 (2013) (“Among the broader structural features that keep
damages judgments in check may be the absence of jury trials and limitations on
discovery.”).
6
See Fusco, supra note 1, at 125–26; Miquel Montañá, Obama on Patent Trolls: Will
They Be Kept at Bay in Europe?, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (June 13, 2013),
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2013/06/13/obama-on-patent-trolls-will-they-be-kept-atbay-in-europe (listing “a less litigious culture” as one reason for less patent troll activity
in Europe).
7
See, e.g., Morag Macdonald, Beware of the Troll, THE LAWYER (Sept. 26, 2005),
http://www.thelawyer.com/beware-of-the-troll/116783.article (“Europe is less attractive
to [patent trolls] for a number of reasons. The main one of these is . . . . [i]n the US, if
you lose a patent claim, you will only have to bear your own legal costs and not those of
the winning party, as is the case to a greater extent in Europe.”). Though expressly
permitted by law, fee-shifting in U.S. patent cases is quite rare. See Colleen V. Chien,
Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 323, 377 (2012) (reporting that between
2005 and 2011, fees were awarded in just 56 of the approximately 3,000 total patent
infringement suits). By contrast, fee-shifting is routine in all types of cases across
Europe. See id. at 368.
8
See Posting of Matt Levy to the Patent Progress Blog, Patent Progress’s Guide to
Patent Reform Legislation, http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/03/04/patent-progresssguide-to-patent-reform-legislation (Mar. 4, 2014) (listing, summarizing, and linking to
the text of all 12 bills). On December 5, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013), sponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, by a vote of 325 to 91. See, e.g., id. The
Innovation Act proposes a number of reforms, including presumptive two-way fee-
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Europe similarly stands on the precipice of fundamental
changes to its patent system. In 2013, twenty-five EU member
nations (including the U.K.) agreed to found a Unified Patent
Court.9 If ultimately implemented, the court will allow some
European patent owners—those who hold a “unitary patent”—to
litigate continent-wide infringement allegations in a single court
rather than seeking redress in each individual country, similar to
the way in which U.S. patentees can pursue infringement claims in
a single federal district court without filing suit in each state.10
Many fear that this “federalization” of European patent
enforcement will attract patent trolls to Europe.11
shifting, a heightened pleading standard, patent ownership disclosure requirements, and
codification of the customer suit exception. Id. In addition, on June 4, 2013 the President
released a set of executive orders and “legislative recommendations” expressing his
support for many of the provisions included in pending patent reform bills, including
more frequent attorneys fee awards. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheetwhite-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
9
See Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/unitary/patent-court.html (last updated June 3, 2013). The only E.U. members
not to approve the court are Poland and Spain. See Unitary Patent Ratification Process,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprsop/patent/ratification/
index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2013).
10
Creation of the Unified Patent Court will coincide with transition to a “unitary
patent” giving protection across the continent. See Unitary Patent, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/unitary-patent.html (last updated Jan.
28, 2013) (noting that the unitary patent system, which has been provisionally approved
by all E.U. members except Italy and Spain (and Croatia, which joined the EU after the
agreement was signed), will go into effect on “1 January 2014 or the date of entry into
force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, whichever is the later”). Under the
current regime, though a single application can be filed with the E.P.O., patents
ultimately must issue from (and fees must be paid to) each individual nation state in
which the patentee wishes to have protection. See, e.g., Samson Helfgott, PCT Filing and
International Prosecution, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 8, http://www.aipla.org/
learningcenter/library/papers/bootcamps/07patentbootcamp/Documents/Helfgottpaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (“[The E.P.O.] is a centralized search and
examination organization operating on behalf of all of its member states . . . . [that] issues
a grant of a European patent. However, such grant does not give any rights. Once
granted it is then necessary for the applicant to decide into which of the member states he
now wants his patent to be effective . . . . [and] provide the filing fees for entry into that
country.”).
11
See, e.g., EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT—HELP OR
HINDRANCE?, 2010–12, H.C. 1799-I, at Ev w2 (arguing that the Unified Patent Court
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Compared to the enormity of these proposed changes, relevant
empirical evidence is in short supply. Many important questions
lack definitive answers. Are trolls as rare in Europe as the
conventional wisdom suggests? If so, are they scarce due to the
existence of procedural rules—such as fee-shifting provisions—
similar to those proposed in patent reform bills presently under
consideration in the U.S.? Or is the scarcity due to other reasons
entirely—for instance, due to safeguards that a unified patent court
might eliminate?
In this Article, we take a first step toward answering these
questions by reporting the findings of a study of patent litigation
filed in the U.K.12 between 2000 and 2010 by patent holders that
do not sell a product—commonly referred to as non-practicing
entities (“NPEs”).13 We find that lawsuits involving NPEs are
indeed rare in the U.K., but hardly non-existent. Overall, NPEs
account for eleven percent of patent suits litigated in the U.K. over
the entire 2000-2010 period.14
Taking a closer look at NPE litigation outcomes, we also make
tentative assessments of common explanations for the lack of NPE
“will favour non-practising entities (or patent trolls) to the detriment of UK
manufacturing companies” (statement of James Hayles, President, IP Federation)),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/
1799/1799vw.pdf; Danny Hakim, Tech Giants Fear Spread of Patent Wars to Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013, at B1 (reporting that a group of 14 American and European
companies sent a letter to European officials expressing “fear that the new [Unified
Patent Court] system could be vulnerable to what they call patent assertion entities, less
politely known as patent trolls”); Alanna Byrne, EU to Adopt Unified Patent Court
System, INSIDECOUNSEL (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/04/eu-toadopt-unified-patent-court-system (“[T]he unified patent court could bring more patent
trolls out of the woodwork, since successful plaintiffs will be able to recover damages in
nearly all EU countries.”).
12
As we discuss below, the U.K. shares many things in common with the U.S. (both
culturally and legally) and, thus, makes a good jurisdiction for comparative purposes. See
infra note 96.
13
The reason for not analyzing cases filed post-2010 is that complex patent cases can
take several years to pass through the courts system, particularly if there are appeals. For
this reason, we only include cases filed up to 2010 in order to ensure as far as possible
that we analyze cases that have reached an end point, either via settlement or via court
ruling.
14
We find an additional four cases filed by companies that, though they are not NPEs
by our definition, purchased a large portfolio of patents for the purposes of monetization
and, as a result, have been referred to as “patent trolls” by others. See infra Part II.A.
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suits in Europe. Notably, our findings cast doubt on the assertion
that NPEs rarely sue in Europe because they are unable to obtain
high-tech patents. To the contrary, we find that NPEs litigating in
the U.K. overwhelmingly—almost exclusively, in fact—assert
high-tech patents, particularly those related to information and
communications technology.
Our findings tend to suggest, instead, that attorney’s fee awards
are a key factor in the scarcity of NPE activities in Europe. We
find that U.K. NPEs, like their American counterparts, are
extremely unsuccessful in their patent assertion efforts. NPEs fail
to prove infringement and have their patents invalidated—
“revoked” in U.K. patent parlance—much more often than their
product-producing counterparts. Moreover, companies accused of
infringement in the U.K. choose to litigate their cases to judgment,
rather than settle, at relatively high rates. As a result, we find that
U.K. NPEs wind up paying large fee awards—generally in excess
of £250,000—more often than they receive damages awards and
settlement payments from the tech companies they sue. In fact,
our data suggests a pattern in which NPEs try their hand at
litigation in the U.K., ultimately lose, pay a large fee award, and
never attempt to litigate in the jurisdiction again.
Though we caution against drawing broad conclusions from
such a small number of cases, our findings tend to suggest that feeshifting deters NPEs from litigating in the U.K., and thus, feeshifting may successfully reduce the number of NPE suits in the
U.S. as well. Likewise, these findings may indicate that critics of
the Unified Patent Court are—so long as the Unified Patent Court
routinely awards attorney’s fees to winning litigants, which the
current agreement states it will15—overestimating the court’s
impact on NPE activity.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the
methodology used in this study, Part II describes our findings with
15

See Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court No. 16351/12 of 20 June 2013,
art. 69, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1, 18–19, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:175:0001:0040:EN:PDF (stating that “[r]easonable and
proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a
general rule, be borne by the unsuccessful party, unless equity requires otherwise, up to a
ceiling set in accordance with the Rules of Procedure”).
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respect to NPE litigation, and Part III explores what our findings
suggest about conventional wisdom on trolling in Europe.
I. STUDY DESIGN
To study NPE litigation in the U.K., we set out to identify and
gather key information with respect to all patent suits filed in
England and Wales between 2000 and 2010 that were settled or
litigated to a final adjudication. In this Part, we explain how we
constructed our database and what data we collected.
A. Compiling a Database of Patent Suits
The U.K. includes three independent judicial systems: England
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.16 In England and
Wales, patent suits can be brought in one of two courts—most
often in the Patents Court division of the High Court (“PHC”) and,
far less often, in the Patents County Court division of the Central
London County Court (“PCC”).17 Cases from both courts can be
appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom (formerly the House of Lords).18 Patent suits
may also be brought in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but the
number actually filed in these jurisdictions is negligible and, thus,
they do not play a role in our study.

16

See, e.g., The Justice System and the Constitution, JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-accind/justice-sys-and-constitution (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“The United Kingdom has
three separate legal systems; one each for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland.”).
17
The PCC was created in 1990 to serve as an alternative venue to the PHC offering
quicker and less expensive resolution of infringement claims—that is, what might be
referred to in the U.S. as a patent “small claims” court. See H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS
SERVICE, THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE 3 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/patents-court/patents-court-guide.pdf (“[S]et
up in 1990[,] . . . . [t]he PCC was intended to provide a less costly and less complex
alternative to the High Court, Patents Court. The Patents Court is intended to deal with
larger and more complex claims.”). On October 1 2013, the PCC was renamed the
Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court, but for the entirety of our study it was known
as the PCC, and shall be referred to as such throughout this Article.
18
Interim orders of the PCC cases are appealed to the PHC, but final orders are
appealed to the Court of Appeals. See id. at 11.
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To identify relevant patent cases filed in the PHC, we
consulted the H.M. Courts and Tribunals Service’s Patents Court
Diary.19 The Diary is a listing of all hearings scheduled before the
PHC since December 1997 and, accordingly, contains at least one
listing for all cases in which the defendant was served and
responded.20 Claims that are filed, but settle before a defendant
responds, are not made publicly available and, thus, are not
included in our dataset.21 The diary entries provide basic
information on the pertinent court cases, including the case
number, the names of at least one claimant and at least one
defendant, their legal representatives, the date of the scheduled
hearing, and often whether the hearing was subsequently cancelled
because the case was settled or stayed.22 Using this information,
we searched detailed court records available via the British and
Irish Legal Information Institute,23 Lexis,24 and Westlaw25 to
record additional parties to the cases, the patents-in-suit, and case
outcomes.26 Finally, to ensure that our database reflects only

19

See
Patent
Courts
Diary, H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE,
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/court-lists/list-patents-court-diary (last visited Mar. 4,
2014).
20
The Diary includes case management hearings, which the plaintiff must apply for
within fourteen days of the defendant’s answer. See H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE,
CIV. P. R., PART 63.8, PRACTICE DIRECTION 5.3, available at http://www.justice.
gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part63/pd_part63#IDAPGAKC (“The claimant
must apply for a case management conference within 14 days of the date when all
defendants who intend to file and serve a defence have done so.”). This means that cases
are listed in the Court Diary regardless of whether a hearing eventually takes place; that
is, if a case is settled or withdrawn before the first hearing, the case is still listed on the
diary.
21
There is no public data available on the number of cases dropped before an answer
is filed. Some cases heard at the Patents Court do not involve patents, but instead solely
concern other IP rights such as design rights. These cases were also excluded from our
study.
22
See supra note 19.
23
BRITISH & IRISH LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.bailii.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
24
LEXISNEXIS UK, http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
25
WESTLAW UK, http://www.westlaw.co.uk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
26
These sources did not provide any court records for a small number of cases that
were listed in the diary, but which settled very quickly, often before even a preliminary
court hearing. For these cases we searched additional sources, such as media websites,
blogs or the websites of parties’ legal representatives to gather as much information as
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litigation involving issued patents, we excluded cases representing
appeals from administrative decisions of the UK Intellectual
Property Office (UK IPO).27
PCC court records are not publicly available and, thus, are not
included in our database.28 The best data we were able to obtain
consisted of anonymized records for PCC cases adjudicated in
2007 and 2008.29 These records suggest to us that less than ten
percent of U.K. patent litigation takes place at the PCC30 and that
NPEs virtually never file suit there.31
possible. In some instances, we were unable to obtain complete information; however,
there is a core set of variables that we were able to obtain for all cases.
27
These cases are the U.K. equivalent of appeals from the U.S. Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (formerly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences). Compare
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 8 (U.K.) (establishing a patent applicant’s right to “refer”
patentability decisions to the Comptroller General), and Patents Act, 1977, § 97 (stating
that decisions of the Comptroller can be appealed to the PHC), with 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(2012) (granting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction to hear
appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)), and 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)
(establishing the PTAB).
28
The PCC now publishes a case diary, but began doing so only in February 2011. See
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (formerly Patents County Court) Diary, MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/court-lists/patents-countycourt-diary.
29
This information was generously provided to us by the UK IPO, which previously
received special permission to hand collect a small amount of data directly from the
PCC’s archives provided it did not reveal the identity of the litigating parties.
30
Based on our anonymized dataset of 2007-2008 PCC cases, we estimate that less
than 10% of U.K. patent suits are filed in the PCC. Accord Zeebroeck & Graham, supra
note 5, at 8 n.11 (noting that “the official Patent High Court diary . . . appeared to include
over 90% of all [U.K. patent] cases decided in the period 2000–2009”).
31
For one, cases brought in the PCC are limited in a number of respects for the express
purpose of significantly reducing the cost of defense and the possible recovery—both of
which patent trolls traditionally try to maximize. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2128 (2013)
(dividing trolls into three primary groups: those that shoot for large damages awards,
those that impose litigation costs to extract nuisance-value settlements, and those that
aggregate large numbers of patents and rarely litigate). For example, a patentee litigating
at the PCC can recover no more than £500,000 in damages and £50,000 in legal costs, see
THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE, supra note 17, at 3, and generally will be limited to
asserting no more than 3 claims, id. at 17. Two of us previously estimated that, in
practice, the amount at stake and fees incurred in PCC cases are typically far below these
maximums. See Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh, Patent Litigation in the UK, 10
LAW SOC’Y ECON., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 13 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154939&download=yes (estimating
that the average PCC case involves about £50,000 in damages and £10,000 in legal fees).
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In all, we located 300 patent suits32 at the PHC over the elevenyear period 2000-2010.33
B. Patent-, Party-, and Suit-Specific Data
For each suit, we gathered a variety of data relating to the
outcome of the litigation and the patents and parties involved.34
Second, we find that patents enforced at the PCC are relatively young and
overwhelmingly cover simple mechanical inventions. Id. They are not old high-tech
patents, which tend to be trolls’ weapon of choice. See infra note 71 and accompanying
text. This uniformity may result from the fact that the PCC can transfer to the PHC cases
that involve complex technology. THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE, supra note 17, at
18. Finally, though we cannot identify the specific parties to these PCC cases, we can tell
from court records that none of the patentees were individuals. See Helmers &
McDonagh, supra (manuscript at 13–14). Rather, they appear to be small companies that
have been in business for a number of years in the metals/machinery industry. See id. We
are aware of just two counter examples. One is an NPE case in our database that was
filed in the PHC, but subsequently transferred to the PCC. See Envtl. Recycling Techs.
Plc v Upcycle Holdings Ltd., [2012] EWHC 2097 (Pat) (Eng.) (transferring an NPE
revocation suit originally filed in the PHC to the PCC because the patentee was relatively
unsophisticated and unable to afford full-blown litigation expenses). The other, which
we discovered by searching media reports, is the only NPE suit we know of that was
litigated exclusively in the PCC during the time period of our study. British Judge Rocks
E-Data in Patent Suit, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS (July 1, 2005),
http://libn.com/2005/07/01/british-judge-rocks-edata-in-patent-suit (“Last month, E-Data,
a ‘patent troll’ whose revenue hinges on pursuing infringement cases based on its
intellectual property, lost a key case [in the PCC] . . . .”).
32
For the purpose of clarity, where a number of separately filed cases involving the
same parties were joined and heard together we considered these cases to be “one case.”
The distribution of cases over the sample period is as follows: 2000: 19; 2001: 22: 2002:
24; 2003: 28; 2004: 27; 2005: 28; 2006: 40; 2007: 31; 2008: 37; 2009: 21; 2010: 23.
33
Two of us previously published a paper looking at this data for 2000-2008 in greater
detail. Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 31. By way of comparison, roughly ninetyfour times more patent suits were filed in the U.S. during the same period. LEX MACHINA,
Districts, https://lexmachina.com/members/courts?filter=Patent (last visited July 19,
2013) (showing that there were 28,180 total patent suits filed in the U.S. between 2000
and 2010). On a per capita basis, the ratio of U.S. to U.K. patent suits shrinks to 19:1.
See Population (Total), supra note 3 (showing that the population of the U.K. is roughly
1/5 of the U.S. population). On a per patent basis, the ratio is even smaller, roughly 5:1.
Compare U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2012, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014) (showing that the U.S. issued 2,071,149 patents between 2000 and
2010, including patents granted in 2000 and 2010), with Statistical Country Profiles:
United Kingdom, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/
countries/gb.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (showing that the U.K. issued 106,969
patents between 2000 and 2010).
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First, for each patent-in-suit, we identified the patent’s priority
date35 and technology classifications.36
Next, for each suit, we identified all litigating parties and
determined whether or not each patentee was an NPE. In this
study we define NPE as any patent-asserting37 entity that did not
sell a product or (non-IP related) service at the time of its suit.38
As a result, our database includes entities that fall outside the scope
of other common designations like “patent assertion entity”
(PAE)39 and excludes others that have been hit on occasion with
34

In gathering this data we used a standardized case template created in collaboration
with Ulrike Till.
35
As in the U.S., the priority date for a patent in the U.K. is the filing date of the
patent’s application or of the earliest relevant parent application to which it claims
priority. Compare Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 63, Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). Detailed information on the
litigated patents was obtained from the European Patent Office’s (EPO) Espacenet and
PATSTAT (version October 2011). Since court records are not available for all cases
and some court records do not identify the patent numbers, we have information on
litigated patents for only 57% of court cases (171 cases) but 91% of all NPE cases (30
cases).
36
Specifically, we identified the patent’s International Patent Classification number.
See International Patent Classification (IPC) Official Publication, WIPO,
http://web2.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=page (last visited July 19, 2013), as listed on
PATSTAT.
37
As discussed in greater detail below, we included both cases in which an NPE is
suing a product-producing company for infringement and cases in which a productproducing company is pre-emptively suing an NPE in hopes of invalidating one or more
of its patents or showing that they are not infringed. We excluded all other cases
involving NPEs; for example, revocation actions filed by NPEs, disputes over patent
ownership between NPEs and other parties, and disputes over the terms of alreadyexecuted license agreements between NPEs and other parties. Finally, we also excluded
cases in which NPEs sued along with their product-producing exclusive licensees.
38
Though we believe that this is the most common definition of the term, others have
used alternative formulations. RPX’s definition of NPE, for example, includes “noncompeting entities,” which are “practicing compan[ies] asserting patents that [they] do[]
not [themselves] practice.” See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, STAN.
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at A-6, A-6 n.2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2146251 (describing the RPX
database she and other scholars have used and explaining that she excluded NCEs from
her analysis).
39
Colleen Chien, who coined the term, defined PAEs as “entities . . . focused on the
enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their patents.”
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010). The term
“excludes universities, startups and others who seek to commercialize or transfer their
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the “patent troll” moniker despite selling products at the time of
suit.40
Accordingly, we report statistics below for all NPEs, as well as
the subset of NPEs that best fit the traditional definition of PAE.
We also point out a set of suits brought by patentees that fall
outside our definition of NPE and PAE but nonetheless share many
characteristics in common with PAEs. In this way, rather than
providing our own definition of “patent troll,” we invite the reader
to decide for him or herself where to draw the line.
To classify among NPEs, we use a modified version of the
NPE taxonomy developed by Lemley and Myhrvold.41 Our
classifications are shown below in Table 1. Class 1 includes
companies in the business of enforcing patents acquired from
others or salvaged from a failed product company or start-up.42
Class 2 includes companies founded by an inventor for the purpose
of holding and enforcing his or her own patents. Class 3 includes
universities and spin-offs formed to hold and enforce patents
developed by university faculty.43 Class 4 includes start-up
companies suing while their first product is still in development.
Class 5 includes individual inventors suing in their own name.
Class 6 includes companies formed to hold and enforce a patent
pool created by a consortium of product-producing companies.
And, finally, Class 7 includes companies formed to hold and

technology.” Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 38, at 1 n.3. Jeruss, Feldman,
and Walker use a similar term, “patent monetization entity” (PME), which they define as
“entities whose primary focus is deriving income from licensing and litigation, as
opposed to making products.” Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). They exclude universities and individuals from the
definition, but do include at least some IP-holding subsidiaries of product-producing
companies. See id. at 369–70 (“[I]f a computer manufacturer were to spin part of its
patent portfolio off into a separate entity . . . the spin-off should be classified as a patent
monetization entity.”).
40
See infra Part II.A.
41
See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of
the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
42
Our Class 1 is a combination of Lemley-Myhrvold Classes 1, 3, and 4. See id.
43
Our Class 3 is a combination of Lemley-Myhrvold Classes 6 and 2. See id. We find
no examples of patents asserted by government entities or NGOs.
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enforce patents covering technology developed by a productproducing parent company.
Table 1: NPE Types
Entity Class
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Description
IP Licensing Company, Acquired Patents
IP Licensing Company, Owned by
Inventor
University or Spin-off
Start-up, Suing Pre-Product
Individual
Industry Consortium
IP Subsidiary of a Product-Producing
Company

To classify the patentees in our database, we combined
information obtained from court records, the patents-in-suit, the
entities’ websites, and third-party databases like Compustat,
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British
Company Directory.
Finally, we identified the type and outcome of each suit.
English patent suits, like those filed in the U.S., can take one of
several forms. In addition to a typical infringement action—in
which the patentee is the plaintiff and the defendant is the accused
infringer—companies that fear future liability for patent
infringement may themselves pre-emptively file suit against the
patentee.44 In the U.K., these suits are known as “revocation”
actions because they seek to invalidate, or “revoke,” the patent-insuit.45 We also observed a second form of declaratory judgment
44

Patent litigation at the PHC is guided by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). See
generally H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, CIV. P. R., available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
45
See UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, LITIGATION MANUAL, Ch.
14 (March 2013 ed.), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/litigation-chapter14.pdf. In
conjunction with a revocation claim, or as an alternative to such a claim, a party can also
seek a “declaration of non-infringement.” The analogy between U.S. declaratory

524

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:509

action, one that seeks not to invalidate a patent but rather a
declaration that it is not essential to an industry standard and, thus,
not infringed by all products that comply with the standard.
In addition to the type of claim underlying each suit, we
identified the suit’s ultimate outcome. We noted whether the suit
settled or reached a final judgment and, if it was adjudicated,
whether or not the patent-in-suit was found valid and infringed.46
If the patent-in-suit was found valid and infringed, we recorded
what remedies were awarded.47 If the patent was revoked or found
not-infringed, we instead recorded whether the court awarded the
accused infringer attorney’s fees and, if so, how much.48
judgment actions and U.K. revocation actions is not a perfect one because the U.S.
Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear pre-emptive actions like these. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–41 (1937) (interpreting art. 3, sec. 2
of the U.S. Constitution, which limits juridical power to “cases” and “controversies,” as
limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to “definite and concrete,” as opposed to
“hypothetical or abstract,” disputes). As applied in the patent context, U.S. courts until
recently would only exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which the
plaintiff held “a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). Thus, in theory, revocation actions can be brought
more freely in the U.K. than declaratory judgment actions in the U.S. See Mark D. Janis,
Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S.
Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 109 (1997) (noting that the U.K. revocation system
“employs a liberal standing requirement; no showing of interest is required”).
Nonetheless, we find that most revocation/non-infringement actions filed against NPEs in
the U.K. (14 of 19 total) were brought close in time to parallel actions filed in the U.S.—
i.e., when there did, in fact, appear to be a concrete dispute between the parties. Cf.
Arkema, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 706 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding
jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action brought against a patentee who had
previously sued for infringement of foreign-counterpart patents in Germany and of other
less-relevant patents in the U.S.); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482
F.3d 1330, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Related litigation involving the same technology
and the same parties is relevant in determining whether a justiciable declaratory judgment
controversy exists on other related patents.”).
46
Our data on case outcomes includes the outcome of any appeals.
47
As discussed below, no NPE suits were fully successful. For a general discussion of
remedies available in UK patent actions, see CHRISTINE GREENHALGH ET AL., STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BD. FOR INTELL. PROP. POLICY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN
SMALLER UK FIRMS: A REPORT FOR THE STRATEGY ADVISORY BOARD FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY 50–51 (2010), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearchipenforcement-201010.pdf.
48
H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, CIV. P. R., PART 44.3, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general-rules-about-
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II. FINDINGS
In this Part, we report our findings with respect to NPE
litigation filed in the U.K. We also compare these findings to
corresponding data on U.K. patent litigation between productproducing companies and to data on NPE litigation filed in the
U.S.
A. Overall Totals and Percentages
Of the 300 total patent suits included in our database, we find
that thirty-three, or eleven percent, involve NPEs. A complete list
of NPE suits is included at the end of this Article in Appendix A.
Those thirty-three suits involve a total of twenty-eight unique
NPEs.49 A histogram of NPEs arranged by classification is shown
below in Figure 1. The figure shows that IP licensing entities—the
group of NPEs generally viewed as most “trollish”—are the most
common type of NPE in the U.K.50 Excluding suits filed by
individuals, universities, and IP subsidiaries—i.e., all NPEs that
are traditionally excluded from the definition of terms like PAE—
the percentage of “troll” litigation in the UK falls only slightly to
eight percent.
Overall, this is a modest amount of NPE litigation relative to
the U.S., where studies have estimated that NPEs were responsible
for roughly 25% of U.S. patent suits during the same timeframe.51
costs#rule44.3= (stating that the “general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be
ordered to pay the costs of the successful party” with the amount awarded reflecting “the
conduct of all the parties; whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he
has not been wholly successful; and any payment into court or admissible offer to
settle”).
49
Of the 28 total NPEs, three are individuals who sued along with their own IP
licensing company, and two are individuals who sued along with a co-inventor. Thus,
though our list includes 8 total individuals, there were only three total suits involving just
individual inventors suing in their own name(s).
50
IP Licensing entities are also the most common type of NPE in the U.S. See Brian J.
Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction
Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1328 (2013).
51
See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1604 n.168
(2009) (finding, in a study of 2,300 high-tech patent suits filed between 2000 and 2008,
that NPEs filed 10% of all suits initiated between 2000-2001, 16% between 2002-2003,
16% between 2004-2005, and 20% between 2006-2008); Jeruss et al., The America
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Moreover, we find no evidence that the rate of NPE litigation in
the U.K. is on the rise. To the contrary, NPE litigation has
remained roughly stable in both absolute52 and relative53 terms.
This finding contrasts sharply with experience in the U.S., where
the rate of NPE litigation appears to have increased significantly
during the same time period.54
That said, our findings show that NPE litigation is hardly nonexistent in the U.K. To the contrary, an 11% rate of NPE litigation
roughly corresponds to the level of NPE activity present in the
U.S. during 2000-2001,55 a time when U.S. lawyers and scholars
were already highly critical of their litigation practices.56

Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 357, 365, 377 (2012) (finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each year
from 2007 to 2011, that the percentage attributable to NPEs was roughly 22% in 2007,
27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011); Robin Feldman et al., The
AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., at
*9, *55 (forthcoming 2014) (expanding their prior study to find that NPEs filed roughly
59% of patent suits in 2012).
52
The number of cases oscillates between three cases in 2000 and four in 2010. See
infra App. A. Though there is some variation among years, much of the variation results
from parties filing multiple, near-simultaneous suits against one another. For example,
while there were seven cases filed in 2008, five of these seven were part of the same
dispute between Nokia and IPCom. See id. Thus, viewed in terms of “disputes” between
parties, rather than individual cases, the rate of patent litigation has remained rather
constant.
53
The share of patent suits filed by NPEs was 16% of total cases in 2000 and 17% in
2010. Compare id. with n.32 supra.
54
See supra note 51.
55
Chien, supra note 51, at 1604 (finding, in a study of 2,300 high-tech patent suits
filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits initiated between 20002001).
56
See Teresa Riordan, Trying to Cash in on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at C2;
Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER (July 30, 2001),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005522332&slreturn=20131009163157
(noting that, in 1999, patent claims against Intel totaled over $15 billion); Joff Wild, The
Real Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. BLOG (Aug.
22, 2008), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog (recounting how the term “patent troll”
was coined at Intel in 1999 because, among other reasons, the company wanted to
develop “a pithy term or phrase” that would help bring public attention to the problem of
abusive patent litigation).
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Figure 1: NPE Classification Histogram
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For the sake of completeness, we also note the presence in our
database of three patentees that, though they operated a non-IPrelated business during the time of litigation, also filed a large
number of suits asserting a portfolio of high-tech patents and, thus,
have been labeled a “patent troll” by others in the past. The first,
Gemstar, just barely misses our definition of NPE because it still
owned and operated TV Guide Magazine and the TV Guide
Network when it filed suit against Virgin Media in 2008, alleging
infringement of three patents covering various aspects of electronic
program guides for TV set top boxes.57 Gemstar sold its TV Guide
businesses just months later but pursued the case until 2011 when
the Court of Appeal affirmed the PHC’s 2009 decision invalidating

57

See Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l Inc. v. Virgin Media Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3068,
[1] (Eng.).
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all three asserted patents.58 Now known as Rovi Corp,59 Gemstar
has aggressively asserted its patent portfolio and has been
identified as an NPE or PAE by many commentators.60
Another serial patent enforcer, Document Security Systems
(DSS), also appears in our database, unsuccessfully defending a
patent revocation action brought by the European Central Bank.61
Though DSS maintains a customer base for its products and
services, and thus is not an NPE or PAE by our definition, the
company has been repeatedly hit with the “troll” label,62
particularly after merging with NPE Lexington Technology Group
and filing suit in the U.S. against the likes of Facebook, LinkedIn,
Novell, and Salesforce.com.63
A third patentee, Visto Corp, also warrants mentioning. Our
database includes two suits between Visto and smartphone maker
58

See Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l Inc. v. Virgin Media Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 302,
[43] (Eng.).
59
See Company Overview of Rovi Guides, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 9,
2013, 5:10 PM), http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=341789 (“The company was formerly known as Gemstar-TV Guide
International, Inc. and changed the name to Rovi Guides, Inc. in May, 2008. The
company was founded in 1992 and is based in Santa Clara, California. As of May 2,
2008, Rovi Guides, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Rovi Corporation.”).
60
See, e.g., Timo Fischer & Jaochim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for
Technology: An Empirical Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions 29 (Apr. 28, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102.
61
See European Cent. Bank v. Document Sec. Sys. Inc., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 600,
[194] (Eng.); European Cent. Bank v. Document Sec. Sys. Inc., [2008] EWCA Civ 192,
[52]. The ECB also filed claims to invalidate the patent in France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Belgium, in an attempt to
completely invalidate the patent in all nine jurisdictions. See Press Release, Document
Security Systems, Inc., Document Security Systems to Move Forward with Infringement
Suit vs. ECB (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Document
+Security+Systems+to+Move+Forward+with+Infringement+Suit+vs-a0172571704.
62
See, e.g., Maxwell Fisher, Are Patent Litigations Skewing Earnings Reality?,
MOTLEY FOOL BLOG NETWORK (Nov. 12, 2002), http://beta.fool.com, available at
http://beta.fool.com/stockcroc1/2012/11/12/are-patent-litigations-skewing-earningsreality/16210.
63
See Bascom Research, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-06293 (N.D. Cal);
Bascom Research, LLC v. Linkedin Corporation, No. 3:12-cv-06294, 2013 WL 3355736
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013); Bascom Research, LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-06295
(N.D. Cal.); Bascom Research, LLC v. Salesforce.com, No. 3:13-cv-02891 (N.D. Cal.);
Fisher, supra note 62.
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RIM.64 Shortly before filing those suits, NTP—an NPE made
famous for settling prior U.S. patent claims against RIM for $612
million in 200665—acquired an equity stake in Visto and licensed
the company many of its patents.66 Nonetheless, Visto continued
to provide mobile email services during this time and, thus, was
not an NPE by our strict definition.67 Other commentators have
come to a contrary conclusion, however.68 In 2009, Visto acquired
64

In 2008, Visto lost a suit against RIM when the PHC held that the patent-in-suit was
invalid. See Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 335, [187]–
[188] (Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 819, [1]
(Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 900, [29] (Eng.);
Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 1921, [40] (Eng.). RIM
also counterclaimed for patent revocation. See Research in Motion UK Ltd v. Visto
Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 3025, [2]–[3] (Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd v. Visto
Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 3026, [12] (Eng.).
65
See Press Release, Research in Motion Ltd., Research in Motion and NTP Sign
Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006), available at
http://press.blackberry.com/press/2006/pressrelease-981.html.
66
See Press Release, Visto Corp., Visto and NTP Sign Patent Licensing Agreement
(Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/visto-and-ntpsign-patent-licensing-agreement-55539132.html; NTP Sticks It to RIM, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-12-14/ntpsticks-it-to-rim. Visto also brought suit against RIM in the U.S. alleging infringement of
four patents related to wireless data transmission. See Anne Broache, Visto Wins Patent
Suit, Sues BlackBerry Maker, CNET NEWS (May 1, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1039_36066898.html?part=rss&tag=6066898&subj=news.
That case followed earlier
infringement suits against Microsoft, Good Technology, and others—suits that were
financed by an investment of $35 million from patent litigation investment firm Altitude
Capital Partners. See Joe Mullin, Visto v. Fixmo: Longtime Patent Litigant Kicks off 2012
with a New Suit, PATENT EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2012), http://patentexaminer.org/
2012/01/visto-longtime-patent-litigant-kicks-off-2012-with-a-new-patent-suit.
67
Accord Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of
“Fair Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 791, 805 (2006) (“NTP’s licensing
scheme has in turn spawned new second-hand trolling, as exemplified by Visto’s suit
against Microsoft in December 2005 and RIM in April 2006. Though Visto does not fall
under the definition of ‘patent troll’ because it does in fact practice the art, the chain
reaction of litigation sparked by NTP is not optimal for efficient markets and judicial
systems.”).
68
See Mullin, supra note 66 (“Because it formed an alliance with patent-holding
company NTP, Visto has been sometimes hit with the moniker ‘patent troll,’ even though
its management has insisted it is a mobile e-mail company, where patent litigation is not
the focus.”). In a prior working paper, two of us included Visto’s suit within a broad
category of “patent-assertion entity litigation.” Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh,
Trolls at the High Court? 10 LAW SOC’Y ECON., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 13
(2012).
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Good Technology (of which NTP also owned an equity stake)
from Motorola in a deal that settled prior patent litigation between
the companies and thereafter adopted the Good Technology
name.69
These companies epitomize the difficulties inherent in
classifying patentees, as well as the lack of uniformity among
commentators’ rubrics for doing so. Were we to additionally
include patent suits involving these companies, the share of PAE
litigation would rise to 12.3%. In the remainder of the paper,
however, we use the strict definition of NPE introduced above that
excludes Gemstar, DSS, and Visto.
B. NPE Patents
Comparing patents asserted in the U.K. by NPEs and productproducing companies, we find that both sets of patents are roughly
similar in age at the time of assertion, but that NPE-owned patents
are far more likely to cover high-tech subject matter. We also find
that, prior to the time of suit, NPE-owned patents were unlikely to
be identified as such in U.K. public records. The latter two
findings mirror similar results among NPEs litigating in the U.S.
Figure 2 below compares the ages of patents asserted in the
U.K. by NPEs and product companies.70 We find that both groups
assert patents of a similar age, about eleven years post-filing on
average. U.S. NPEs assert patents on a comparable timeline, while
U.S. product-producing companies generally file suit more
quickly.71
69

See Mullin, supra note 66.
Here, by patent “age” we mean the number of years that passed since the patent’s
priority date and the filing of the law suit in which it was asserted.
71
See Love, supra note 50, at 1335 (finding that patents asserted by U.S. NPEs are, on
average, asserted about 12 years post-filing, while U.S. product-producing companies
assert patents are about 3 years younger on average). The discrepancy between the ages
of patents asserted by U.S. and U.K. product-producing companies is likely explained (at
least in large part) by the fact that U.K. companies assert a much higher percentage of
pharmaceutical patents, which tend to be litigated only when they are relatively old. See
infra Figure 2 and Table 2; Love, supra note 50, at 1351 (noting that pharmaceutical
patents are frequently litigated toward the end of the patent term against generic
manufacturers seeking a head start in the production of low-cost alternatives to successful
name brand drugs).
70
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Figure 2: Comparison of Litigated Patents by Age
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Figures 3 and 4 compare the subject matter of patents asserted
by NPEs and product companies, and Table 2 compares the
industry designations of companies accused of infringing NPEand product company-owned patents.72
NPE patents
overwhelmingly
cover
high-tech
inventions
and
are
overwhelmingly asserted against high-tech companies, while
product-company patents predominately relate to pharmaceuticals.
About 70% of U.K. NPE patents were assigned a technology
classification directly related to telecommunications or computing,
and roughly 76% of companies accused of infringing an NPE
patent operate in the high-tech, computer, and telecommunications

72

Companies’ SIC codes were retrieved from various firm-level databases including
Compustat, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British Company
Directory. We use the UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities
2003 published by the U.K. Office for National Statistics. See OFFICE FOR NATIONAL
STATISTICS, UK STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 2003
(2003).
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industries.73 Further, we find that 76% of U.K. NPE patents are
“software patents” as defined by Allison and Mann, and that 71%
of U.K. NPE suits involve at least one software patent.74 These
findings are consistent with existing studies of U.S. NPEs75 and
tend to suggest that NPEs as a whole strongly favor aging hightech patents, even in jurisdictions where such patents are
considered hard to come by.

73

As used below in Table 2, “high-tech” is defined to include the manufacture of
electrical and optical equipment (which contains manufacture of office machinery and
computers; manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified;
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus; and
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks). See id. at
31–32. The large share of companies sued by NPEs in “other services” is explained by
cases HC06C03416 and HC07C03466 where an NPE Cranway Ltd. sued a number of
companies in the electronic/video gambling and betting industry which is classified as
“other recreational activities (SIC 9271).”
74
As defined by Allison and Mann, “a software patent is one in which at least one
claim element covers data processing—that is, the act of manipulating data—regardless
of whether the code carrying out that data processing is on a magnetic storage medium or
embedded in a chip.” John R. Allison & Ronald A. Mann, The Disputed Quality of
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 309 (2007).
75
James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REG., Winter
2011-2012, at 26, 29 (finding that 62% of patents litigated by NPEs between 1990 and
2010 were “software patents” and 75% covered “computer and communications
technology”); Love, supra note 50, at 1344 Figure 8 (finding that roughly 66% of NPE
patent assertions were brought to enforce a software patent and 82% were brought to
enforce a high-tech patent).
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Figure 3: Tech. Class Comparison of Litigated Patents
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Figure 4: Detailed Tech. Class Distribution of NPE Patents
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Table 2: Industry Distributions
Sector

Prod. Co. Cases*
# Firms
%

Business Services
Chemicals/Pharma.
Computer Services
Construction
Finance, Insurance, & Real
Estate
Food

24
197
18
4

4.5%
37.2%
3.4%
0.8%

4
2

0.8%
0.4%

High-tech§
Metals & Machinery
Other Manufacturing
R&D Services
Textiles & Apparel
Trade
Transportation
Wood & Paper

82
66
28
12
7
42
8
6

Other Services¥
Telecommunications
Petroleum & Refining

4
16
10

NPE Cases‡
# Firms
%
1
1
3

2.0%
2.0%
6.1%

15.5%
12.5%
5.3%
2.3%
1.3%
7.9%
1.5%
1.1%

20
8

40.8%
16.3%

2

4.1%

0.8%
3.0%
1.9%

10
4

20.4%
8.2%

530
49
Notes: * Excludes NPE cases; Only companies sued by or suing NPEs; §
High-tech: manufacture of electrical and optical equipment (which contains
manufacture of office machinery and computers; manufacture of electrical
machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified; manufacture of radio,
television and communication equipment and apparatus; manufacture of
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks); ¥ Other
services: including gambling and betting activities as well as other unspecified
service activities.
‡

Finally, we also find that companies targeted by NPEs in the
U.K. had little reason to suspect ex ante that the patents-in-suit
were owned by NPEs. For more than half of all NPE-asserted
patents in our database, an entity other than the NPE involved in
litigation was listed in the European Patent Office’s (EPO)
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Espacenet online database as the patent’s legal owner.76 We
cannot say from this data alone whether these NPEs were actively
hiding their patent holdings. However, this finding does match
NPE behavior in the U.S.77 and, accordingly, tends to suggest that
NPEs value concealing their activities both in the U.S. and
abroad.78
C. NPE Litigation
Next, taking a closer look at individual cases, we find that U.K.
NPE suits are predominantly revocation actions and rarely end in
success for NPEs. As shown below in Table 3, the majority of
U.K. NPE cases (61%) were initiated by the accused infringer,
rather than the patentee. This rate of revocation/non-infringement
claims is high compared to both U.K. product-producing
companies and U.S. NPEs. In the U.S., just 14-15% of patent suits
are filed by possible infringers, and even that number is inflated by
the fact that many are filed after an infringement action for the
purposes of forum shopping.79
76

Espacenet Patent Search, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://worldwide.
espacenet.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). A list of these patents is included in
Appendix B.
77
See, e.g., Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Assoc., to the
FTC (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/pae/pae-0042.pdf
(“Under the present [U.S. patent] system it is too easy for PAE’s to hide behind legal
fictions . . . . [T]his secrecy makes it very difficult to determine what patents a PAE
owns, . . . . allow[ing] a PAE to increase its market power by acquiring a portfolio
containing substitute patents . . . [and] creat[ing] an environment that is ripe for abuse and
gamesmanship.”). One large U.S.-based NPE, Intellectual Ventures, reportedly holds and
enforces its patent portfolio via a network of roughly 2,000 shell companies. See Method
and System for Exposing Multi-Billion Dollar Racketeering Scheme, PLAINSITE (Dec. 17,
2012), http://www.plainsite.org/articles/article.html?id=2. Legislation presently pending
in the U.S. would pressure patentees to disclose patent transfers by limiting patentees’
ability to recover damages for infringement that occurred during periods when ownership
records were out of date. End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (May 16,
2013).
78
See Markus Reitzig et al., Collateral Damage for R&D Manufacturers: How Patent
Sharks Operate in Markets for Technology, 19 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 947, 947
(2010) (noting that patent trolls “exploit information asymmetries in markets for
technology”).
79
See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment
to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1081, 1082 Table 2
(2012) (finding that 13.9% of patent suits filed in 2008 were declaratory judgment actions
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Table 3: Comparison of Claim Types
Prod. Co.
# Cases
%

NPE
# Cases

%

Infringement
Revocationˣ

116
85

43.4%
31.8%

13
17

39.4%
51.5%

Other**
n.a.‡

30
36

11.2%
13.5%

3
0

9.1%
0.0%

Total
267
100.0%
33
ˣ Includes partial revocation; ** Includes declaration of
non-infringement; ‡ Claim unknown.

100.0%

Moving to case outcomes, shown below in Table 4, we find an
unexpectedly large number of invalidity and non-infringement
rulings. While 75% or more of U.S. patent suits settle,80 just 51%
(17 out of 33) U.K. NPE cases ended in settlement, and even this
number is arguably inflated. Six suits that settled were part of two
larger disputes—four were effectively part of the same long-

(335 of 2412) and that 13.4% of declaratory judgment actions were brought by an
accused infringer who filed suit after the patentee and moved to transfer venue of the
dispute to the court hearing the declaratory judgment action (45 of 335)); see also Jeanne
C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1464 (2010) (finding that 15.5% of
utility patent suits filed in 2005, except those filed in the “notoriously patentee-friendly
Eastern District of Texas,” were declaratory judgment actions); Kimberly A. Moore,
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (finding that 14% of patent suits that terminated between 1983
and 1999 were declaratory judgment actions).
80
See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687–689, (2011) (finding that between 2000 and 2010,
patentees that asserted the same patent in eight or more cases settled about 89% of the
time, or 1,004/1,134 of all cases in the dataset that were not still pending); Sara Jeruss et
al., The AIA 500 Expanded, supra note 51 (manuscript at 79 Table) (finding that patent
suits filed by NPEs in 2007-2008 and 2011-12 settled or ended with a consent judgment
about 75% of the time, and only reached a judgment on the merits about 3% of the time);
Love, supra note 71 at 1346 Table 9 (finding that of litigated U.S. patents issued between
May 1993 and May 1994, roughly 80% were never adjudicated on the merits).
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running dispute between Nokia and IPCom and two were part of
the same dispute between Nokia and Interdigital.81
Further, in those cases that proceeded to judgment, U.K. NPEs
were surprisingly unsuccessful. Of the twelve NPE cases that
ended with a full judgment, infringement was found in just one
case, and even that was a partial victory— only one of the four
patents asserted in the case was found to be essential to, and thus
infringed by, the technological standard at issue.82 In all other
adjudicated NPE suits, the asserted patents were held to be either
not-infringed or invalid,83 giving U.K. NPEs an abysmal eight
percent success rate, well below that for U.K. product-producing
patentees.84 That said, these findings are roughly consistent with
the performance of U.S. NPEs, which also fail to prove validity
and infringement at extremely high rates, both in absolute terms
and relative to their product-producing counterparts.85

81

See infra app. A.
See Nokia v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 3077, [134] (Eng.).
83
The patent-in-suit in Rambus’s suits against Micron and Hynix/Hyundai was first
revoked by the EPO, not the PHC. See Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd,
[2004] EWHC (Pat) 2313, [4] (Eng.) (“There were challenges to the patent in the
European Patent Office and . . . . [t]he result of that challenge is that the patents were
revoked and it is for that reason that Hynix and Micron now seek to have these
proceedings dismissed.”).
84
We also find that NPEs are extremely unsuccessful on appeal. In suits between
product-producing companies between 2000-2010, judgments were appealed about 45%
of the time to the Court of Appeal, and those appeals affirmed the PHC three quarters of
the time. NPE suits, by contrast, were appealed just 4 of 12 times, and the PHC decision
was affirmed every time in those appeals.
85
See Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,
supra note 80, at 693 Table 8 (finding that between 2000 and 2010, NPEs that asserted
the same patent in eight or more cases lost more than 92% of the time when they litigated
to a judgment, while equally-litigious product-producing companies won 40% of time);
Love, supra note 50, at 1346 Table 9 (finding that, of litigated U.S. patents issued
between May 1993 and May 1994, more than 83% owned by NPEs were found notinfringed or invalid, while almost 48% of those owned by product-producing companies
were found valid and infringed); Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded, supra
note 51 (manuscript at 87) (finding that, in U.S. patent cases filed in 2007-2008 and
2011-12, product-producing companies won about 44% of the time their patents were
adjudicated on the merits, while PMEs and individuals won just 17% and 23% of the
time, respectively).
82
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Finally, we report information on fee-shifting awards in U.K.
NPE suits. Unfortunately, due to the widespread practice of parties
settling fee amounts outside of court,86 we find publicly available
information for just two NPE disputes—and even that information
is incomplete. After losing its consolidated suits against Micron
and Hyundai, Rambus was ordered to pay its adversaries’ fees in
2004.87 Micron estimated its costs at £698,000 ($1,151,000), and
Hyundai estimated its costs at £233,000 ($384,000);88 however, the
parties subsequently settled the issue before the court could make a
final ruling on the fee award. Similarly, in January 2010, the PHC
ruled in an on-going case between IPCom and Nokia that Nokia
had prevailed on enough issues to qualify for a future fee award in
the case.89 At the time, Nokia estimated that its fees in the case
were £1.3 million ($2.1 million).90 In a subsequent hearing, the
court estimated Nokia’s fees for all cases between the two parties
at “close to £3 million” ($4.9 million) and ordered IPCom to pay a
two-thirds share.91
Overall, the outcome between Nokia and IPCom is a very
common one. Across all patent litigation, the “winning” party
recovers on average about two-thirds of its requested legal fees,
86

See Chris Forsyth & Justin Watts, A Guide to Patent Litigation in England and
Wales, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP 8 (Sept. 2011), http://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=6bd0f5bc-df2c-4578-8102-02c6d3c9946f (noting that courts
may assess fee awards if “the parties are unable to agree the costs to be paid by the losing
party” and that the “assessment procedure may take several months and involves a ‘minitrial’” for which the losing party may also pay).
87
See Rambus, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Pat) 2313, [47]
(Eng.) (ordering “that the claimant shall pay the costs of these actions to the defendants to
be assessed, if not agreed”).
88
Id. at [6].
89
Nokia GMBH v. IPCom GMBH, [2010] EWHC (Pat) 790, [12] (Eng.).
90
Id. at [3]. At the same hearing, IPCom’s costs were estimated to be £300,000. Id.
91
Nokia GMBH v. IPCom GMBH, [2010] EWHC (Pat) 791, [1] (Eng.). We also
observed two fee awards in cases involving companies that almost meet our NPE/PAE
criteria. In Gemstar v. Virgin Media, Virgin Media won a fee award of 86.5% of the £2.4
million it estimated it has spent on the case (that is, roughly £2 million ($3.3 million)).
Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l v. Virgin Media Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Pat) 3552, [4], [35] (Eng.).
In RIM v. Visto, due to the fact that various issues in the case went both ways, Visto was
ordered to 66% of RIM’s estimated £6 million ($9.9 million) of costs and RIM was
ordered to pay 51% of Visto’s estimated £1.6 million ($2.6 million) of costs. Research in
Motion U.K. Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 819, [15], [50] (Eng.). The net
result was a fee award in RIM’s favor of over £3.1 million ($5.1 million).
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depending on how various aspects of the case were won or lost.92
Further, our prior research suggests that the cost of defending a
case to judgment at the PHC runs between £500,000 ($825,000)
and £3 million ($4.9 million).93 Thus, though we lack the data to
say so with much additional certainty, we think it is fair to estimate
that in the remaining NPE cases that reached judgment, the parties
reached a settlement in which the losing patentee agreed to pay the
winning accused infringer no less than about £250,000 ($410,000).
By contrast, in the U.S., where courts award attorney’s fees only in
“exceptional” cases,94 patentees who fail to prove their claims only

92

See Richard Willoughby, United Kingdom, in GLOBAL PATENT LITIGATION:
STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 32 (Willem A. Hoyng & Frank W.E. Eijsvogels eds., 2008)
(“[I]t is usual for the winning party to recover from the loser approximately 60% or 65%
of the actual costs incurred by the winning party.”); see also FORSYTH & WATTS, supra
note 86, at 8 (“A successful party will recover a proportion of its legal costs from the
losing party. This usually works out at about half to two-thirds of its total legal costs.”).
93
See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 31 (manuscript at 22); see also FORSYTH &
WATTS, supra note 86, at 8 (“When cases go to trial in the English system, each side will
usually incur total costs in the region of €1.5m. Costs in small cases can be much lower.
Costs under €0.75m are low and costs will go over €3m only in very large and complex
cases.”); Michael Burdon, The UK: Can a High-Cost Country Change Its Way?, WIPO
MAG. (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01
/article_0003.html (“[T]he cost of legal representation and experts in most patent disputes
conducted in the U.K. is unlikely to be estimated at less than £350,000.”); Garreth
Duncan, Challenging Competitors’ Patents in the UK—Patent Revocation, D YOUNG &
CO (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.dyoung.com/article-patentrevocation (“Typically,
infringement/revocation actions in the Patents Court . . . cost in the region of £200,000 to
£500,000 for straight-forward cases but can cost up to and more than £1,000,000 for
complex cases.”).
94
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). This term the Supreme Court of the United States
granted cert in a pair of cases that challenge the current standard for determining whether
a patent case is “exceptional.” See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC,
496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013)
(No. 12-1184); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163). As of
this Article’s publication, the Court had not released an opinion in either case. Fees are,
on occasion, also awarded in patent suits under other statutes and rules. See, e.g., Ajeet
Pai, Attorneys’ Fee Awards in Patent Litigation, VINSON & ELKINS, LLP (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/AjeetPaiAttorneysFee
AwardsPatentLitigationCLE_Aug2010.pdf (listing as additional bases for recovering
attorney fees F.R.C.P. Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, F.R.A.P. 38, and courts’ inherent
powers).
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wind up paying their opponents’ attorney’s fees about two percent
of the time.95
III. ANALYSIS
Finally, we make a few broad observations in light of the data
reported above. Though we caution against drawing strong
inferences from such a small number of cases, we believe our
findings suggest that routinely awarding attorney’s fees in patent
suits will reduce the number of NPE suits filed in the U.S. and that
the Unified Patent Court should, like most of its member states,
incorporate a generally-applicable fee-shifting mechanism to deter
NPE litigation.
Our conclusion is based on several similarities between patent
litigation in the U.S. and the U.K. as well as several of our
findings. First, many alternative explanations for the relative
paucity of NPE litigation in Europe seem especially weak when
applied to the U.K. Among European nations, the U.K. is almost
certainly the most similar to the U.S. Culturally, the U.K. and U.S.
share a common language, a common history, and as a result a
traditional (and unique among European nations) body of common
law.96 More specifically, in the realm of patent litigation, the U.K.
95
See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 323, 377
(2012) (reporting that between 2005 and 2011, fees were awarded in just 56 of the
approximately 3,000 total patent suits in which there was a ruling on the merits). Though
similar data has not been collected for U.S. patent cases, in U.S. copyright suits in which
attorney’s fees were awarded, prevailing copyright holders have received 89% of their
fee award requests, and prevailing defendants 61%. Id. at 374–75; see also Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2014) (collecting data on attorneys fee award orders issued in patent cases
between 2003 and 2013).
96
See, e.g., Vipin Gupta et al., Cultural Clusters: Methodology and Findings, 37 J.
WORLD BUS. 11, 13 (2002), available at http://wase.urz.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/
Journal%20Library/International%20Management%20Models/Cultural%20Clusters.pdf
(discussing broad cultural similarity between the U.S. and U.K and finding in a survey of
people from 61 nations that there are 10 “cultural clusters” in the world and that the U.K.
shares more in common with the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand than it does
with other European nations); FORSYTH & WATTS, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing
similarities in legal and business culture that make comparisons between the countries
particularly apt) (“The English legal system is . . . a common law system and the
procedures and practices of English courts differ significantly from those of courts in
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has among the largest damages awards,97 highest costs of
defense,98 and the most onerous discovery requirements in
Europe.99 The U.K. and U.S. also share a great deal in common
with respect to substantive Patent law.100 Accordingly, possible
other European jurisdiction.”); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in
the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2010) (“In their
corporate governance systems, financial structures, and business cultures more generally,
the United States and the United Kingdom arguably have more in common than any other
pair of developed economies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James E. Gregory &
Jennifer Wheater, US/UK Tax Issues for Internationally Mobile Executives, 13 BUS. L.
INT’L 279, 279 (2012) (“Because of their common language, culture and financial
prominence, the links between the United States and the United Kingdom are especially
well-developed and, as a result, there is a constant flow of high-level managerial and
executive talent between these two countries.”); Lisa Vanhala, Legal Opportunity
Structures and the Paradox of Legal Mobilization by the Environmental Movement in the
UK, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 523, 547 (2012) (“As the only country with a common law
legal system in the European environment, the UK can serve as the closest comparator
for developments in the U.S.”).
97
See Zeebroeck & Graham, supra note 4, at 24; cf. COTTER, supra note 5, at 226
(“[T]he amount of damages awarded [by U.K. courts in patent cases] appears . . . to be
relatively modest compared to U.S. standards . . . . Nevertheless, the rules [U.K.] courts
apply in calculating monetary awards are hardly stacked against patent owners . . . . [and]
tend to favor patent owners to a greater degree than economic reasoning would suggest
desirable.”).
98
See COTTER, supra note 5, at 173 (“The cost of proceeding to trial [in the U.K.]
remains high by European . . . standards . . . .”); RUPERT JACKSON, L.J., REVIEW OF CIVIL
LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 250 (2009), available at http://www.ciarb.org
/information-and-resources/2010/01/22/Review%20of%20Civil%20Litigation%20Costs
%20Final%20Report.pdf (“[R]eviewing costs across different EU states . . . ‘[t]he UK
system is the most costly one . . . .’” (quoting Dietmar Harhoff)); Kimberlee Weatherall,
et al., IP Enforcement in the UK and Beyond: A Literature Review, STRATEGIC ADVISORY
BD. FOR INTELL. PROP. POL’Y 43–44 (May 18, 2009), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-200905.pdf (comparing UK patent
litigation costs to those in France, Germany, and the Netherlands).
99
See David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the
European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 564 (1996) (“The English system, unlike
those of its continental European counterparts, involves documentary discovery . . . .”);
Karin Retzer & Sherman Kahn, Balancing Discovery with EU Data Protection in
International Arbitration Proceedings, 3 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L. 47 (2010) (“[C]ivil law
jurisdictions (such as those in continental Europe) generally limit disclosure of evidence
to what is proffered by each party as evidence in support of the party’s case. In contrast,
pre-trial discovery obligations in common law countries, particularly in the United States,
but also in the UK, are much broader.”).
100
See COTTER, supra note 5, at 165 (noting “affinities among the U.K., Canadian, and
Australian [patent] regimes . . . , as well as with the U.S. [patent] system”); Donna M.
Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical
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explanations for Europe’s ability to repel trolls that center on broad
differences in culture, law, and litigation practice appear to apply
with less force in the U.K.101
Further, we find in our data that, despite more restrictions on
the patentability of software,102 U.K. NPEs overwhelmingly assert
software patents covering telecommunications and computer
technology.103 In short, it does not appear that the U.K. has a
shortage of high-tech patents available for NPEs—as some have
postulated104—but rather a shortage of companies willing to assert
patents, period, regardless of the type of invention they cover. We
also find that U.K. NPEs can and do obscure patent ownership
before filing suit,105 and thus have at least one more tactical
advantage (in addition to high costs and large damages awards) in
common with their U.S. counterparts.106 Combining these facts
Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor
Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 183–85 (2009) (noting a similar origin for
U.S. and U.K. patent law, as well as similarities in “the basic requirements of
patentability—novelty, utility, and nonobviousness” and claim construction doctrines and
procedure).
101
To be clear, there are other specific differences between the litigation and patent
systems in effect in both countries—for example, the widespread use of juries in the U.S.
to determine infringement and damages, see Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in
Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 794 (2001) (“The
U.S. may be the only country in the world that uses juries to decide patent disputes . . . .
English juries are not available in patent cases, or in most other civil cases.”), and a
higher standard for invalidating U.S. patents, see Patent Law and Regulation,
LEXISNEXIS (UK), http://lexisweb.co.uk/sub-topics/patent-law-and-regulation (last visited
Nov 10, 2013) (“There is no presumption of validity for UK patents once they are
granted.”). However, as discussed below, these differences are arguably irrelevant given
NPEs’ similar rate of success in both countries. See supra note 85 and accompanying text
(discussing NPEs’ win rate in patent suits filed in the U.S. and in patent suits filed in the
U.K.).
102
See supra note 2.
103
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
104
See supra note 2.
105
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
106
Another arguable advantage they share is access to specialized patent courts. See
Timothy B. Lee, Specialist Patent Courts Are Part of the Problem, FORBES TECH BLOG
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/08/19/specialist-patentcourts-are-part-of-the-problem (arguing that specialized patent courts—including the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as well as de facto specialized trial courts
like the Eastern District of Texas that see a large number of patent suits—tend to skew in
favor of stronger patent rights because they become captured by the patent attorney bar).
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and findings, it would appear that U.K. and U.S. NPEs operate in a
roughly similar cultural and legal environment and share many of
the same tactical advantages in litigation.
So what, then, accounts for the marked difference in NPE
activity between the U.K. and U.S.? At first blush, the low rate of
success for U.K. NPE suits may seem like a plausible explanation.
However, U.S. NPEs as a whole are not much more successful
than those in the U.K.107 In fact, sophisticated NPEs actually lose
slightly more often in the U.S.108 A review of U.S. NPE suits
related to those in our U.K. database, included below in Appendix
C, provides further confirmation.109 Fourteen U.K. NPE suits in
our database proceeded in parallel to a U.S. action between the
same two parties.110 In all four parallel U.S. actions that have been
adjudicated to date, the NPE lost on summary judgment.111 In fact,
among all 138 suits that NPEs in our database filed in the U.S.
during the same timeframe, not a single case has been resolved on
the merits in an NPE’s favor.112
In our view, the most likely explanation for differing rates of
NPE litigation is not the low rate of success we observe, but rather
that lack of success in a system that routinely awards fees to the
winning party. Unlike those litigating in the U.S., NPEs deciding
whether to file suit in the U.K. must consider the very real
possibility that they will not only fail to win damages and recoup
their own legal fees, but also that they will have to pay the accused
infringer an amount approximating two-thirds of the cost of
defense. As discussed above, it is unlikely that an unsuccessful
NPE could walk away from a case paying less than about
£250,000, the equivalent of about $375,000.
Two other observations in our data also tend to support this
conclusion. First, we find very few repeat litigants among U.K.
NPEs. Virtually every NPE case in our database ended in defeat
for the NPE, followed by a hefty payout of fees, and no further
107
108
109
110
111
112

See supra notes 84–85.
Id.
Infra app. C.
Infra app. C.
Infra app. C.
Infra app. C.
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attempts at litigation. By contrast, many of these NPEs filed a
large number of suits in the U.S. over a long period of time, despite
a similarly abysmal record of success.113 One explanation for this
pattern is that a series of NPEs tested the waters in the U.K., found
the experience too expensive, and thereafter chose to direct their
resources elsewhere.
Second, as discussed above, we find a surprisingly low rate of
settlement in U.K. NPE cases and a surprisingly high percentage of
revocation and non-infringement claims. In short, despite an
average cost of defense that rivals those in the U.S., tech
companies accused of infringement in the U.K. are
disproportionately willing to fight to a judgment and, moreover, to
initiate litigation and force the patentee’s hand. Again, a
comparison to related U.S. litigation bears this out—of the 138
patent suits filed in the U.S. by NPEs in our database, 125 (or
roughly 90%) settled.114 One explanation for this phenomenon is
that accused infringers are more willing to fight, and less willing to
settle, because they stand to recoup a large portion of their costs if
they win.115 Taken together, these two observations suggest that
fee-shifting acts to deter patent monetization by changing the
behavior of both plaintiffs and defendants—accused infringers
become more likely to fight (and thereby to deny patentees a quick,
positive settlement and to impose a large, negative penalty); and,
113

Infra app. C. (showing that 14 of the 28 NPEs that litigated in the U.K. also filed
suit in the U.S. and that, in the U.S., they brought a total of 138 suits against a total of
293 accused infringers).
114
Infra app. C.
115
Economic theory suggests that fee-shifting tends to reduce the number of lowprobability-of-success suits that are filed, but also to increase the likelihood that suits
which are filed will proceed to trial rather than settle. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing
Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141, 143 (1998) (“[T]he English rule of fee allocation
(in which the loser pays the winner’s litigation costs) is better at discouraging suits by
low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs than the American rule” but “the English rule
causes a greater number of cases to go to trial.”). For empirical evidence of these effects,
see Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 475 (2004) (noting that Florida’s
experience with fee-shifting in medical malpractice cases brought in the early 1980s was
that “the threat of additional legal fees did somewhat reduce the number of malpractice
cases filed, [but] also increased the number that went to trial”).
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as a result, patentees become less likely to file suit in the first
place.
CONCLUSION
Comparisons of the European and American experiences with
NPEs have so far been long on anecdote and short on data.
However, with the U.S. presently searching for mechanisms to
curb NPE patent enforcement and the E.U. presently considering
adopting measures that many expect to do the opposite, hard data
is needed now more than ever. With this Article, we take a first
step in building an empirical foundation upon which to study
patent troll activities on both sides of the Atlantic, and we hope
that other scholars will follow suit.
Though patent trolls are indeed rare in the U.K. when
compared to the U.S., we find that they nonetheless account for a
substantial and consistent share of U.K. litigation between 2000
and 2010. They are, in short, hardly a uniquely American
phenomenon, as some policymakers have suggested. Moreover,
we find evidence that fee-shifting, more so than other possible
explanations, is responsible for the relatively low rate of NPE
litigation in the U.K. compared to the U.S.116 Though we caution
against basing international patent policy on the experience of any
one country, our results lend support to patent reform measures
currently pending in the U.S. that would increase the frequency
with which fees are shifted in patent suits. Our findings also
suggest that Europe’s new Unified Patent Court may not have as
much of an impact on NPE litigation in Europe as some contend,
so long as it too routinely awards fees to the winning party.

116

This finding was discussed during a recent question and answer session in the UK
House of Commons concerning the impact of ‘patent trolls’ on the UK economy.
Reference was made in this debate to Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 65. This
discussion was reported in the UK Parliamentary record (Hansard) on March 20, 2014,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140320/text/140320w
0002.htm#14032098000031.
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Appendix A
U.K. NPE Cases (2000-2010)
Yearʶ

Case No.

NPE Class.

Claimant(s)

Defendant(s)

Claim

Outcome

2000

HC00C4176 &
HC00C4177

2

Rambus, Inc.

Hyundai Elec.
U.K. Ltd.
Micron Europe
Ltd.

Infringement

Stayed*,
Dismissed

HC00C03655

2

HC00C5233

5
5

HC01C04669

2

2001

5

NewTransducers Labtec Enterprise Infringement
UK Ltd
Ltd.
Honda Motor
Infringement
Steven Tickner
Europe Ltd
Timothy Woodhouse
Honda Europe NV
Honda Motor
Company Ltd

Settled
Valid, Not
infringed

Menashe Business William Hill Org
Ltd.
Mercantile Ltd.
Julian Menashe

Infringement

Settled

HC01CO4779

2

Frontline Tech.
Ltd.

Tasc Computers

Infringement

Settled

2002

HC02C02968

2

Laughlin
Prods., Inc.

Hollywood
Tanning Sys., Inc

Infringement

Settled

2003

HC03C00915

2

Ablaise Ltd.

Nettec PLC
Nettec Sol’ns
Ltd.

Infringement

Other

HC03C01066

2

Revoked

5
5

Frontline Tech.
Ltd.
John Parkes
Martin Frost

Revocation

HC03C02460

Dep. for Educ. &
Skills
Cintec
International Ltd

Groundless
Threats of
Infringement

Not infringed

HC03C02951 &
HC03C02952

3

Affymetrix UK
Ltd
Affymetrix Inc

Multilyte Ltd

Revocation

Settled

2004

HC04C01952

2

Nokia Corp.

Interdigital Tech
Corp.

Revocation

Settled

2005

HC05C00661

5

Jerome Canady

Infringement

Not infringed

HC05C01175

1

T-Mobile U.K. Ltd.
Research in
Motion U.K.

Olympus Corp.
Keymed Ltd.
Erbe Med. UK
Ltd.
Erbe
Elektromedizin
gmbh
.Inpro
Licensing Sarl

Revocation

Revoked
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2006

2007

2008
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HC05C02026

2

HC06C00615 &
HC06C00835

6

HC06C00823
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Nokia Corp.

Interdigital
Tech. Corp.

Noninfringement/
Standard
Essentiality

3 out of
4 patents
Not Infringed

Sandisk

Koninklijke
Philips
Societa
Italiana per lo
Sviluppo
dell'Elettronica
spa (SISVEL)
Institut für
Rundfunktechnik
GmbH
TDF
France
Telecom SA

Revocation

Settledˣ

3

Univ. of
Queensland

Siemens PLC
Siemens
Magnet Tech..
Ltd.

Infringement

Revoked

HC06C03416

1

Cranway Ltd.

Horserace
Totalisator Bd.
Playtech Ltd.

Infringement

Other

HC06C04422

2

Interdigital Tech.
Corp

Nokia
Nokia Siemens
Networks oy

Noninfringement/
Standard
Essentiality

Settled

HC07C03177

7

Assa Abloy AB
Aontec Teoranta

Smartrac IP BV

Revocation

Settled

HC07C03466

1

CranwayLtd

Totesport
Alderney Ltd.
Totesport NV
PTVB Mgmnt.
Ltd.
Playtech Ltd.
Playtech Cyprus
Ltd.
Techplay
Marketing Ltd.
Playtech Softwar
Ltd.
Tote Credit Ltd.

Infringement

Revoked

HC08C00468

2

HTC Corp.

Dataquill Ltd.

Revocation

Settled

HC08C02525

1

Nokia
Nokia Germany
Gmbh
Nokia UK Ltd.

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Revoked

HC08C02526

1

Nokia Germany
Gmbh

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Settled
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HC08C02527

1

HC08C02528

1

HC08C02530

1

HC08C04704

7

HC09C00090

2

HC09C04868

Nokia Germany
Gmbh
Nokia Germany
Gmbh
Nokia Germany
Gmbh
Tip Comm’ns
LLC

549

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Settled

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Settled

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Settled

Motorola Ltd.

Infringement

Settled

HTC Corp.

Yozmot 33 Ltd

Revocation

Revoked

1

Nokia Germany
Gmbh

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

Revoked

HC10C01233

1

Nokia

IPcom Gmbh

Revocation

HC10C01969

5
5
2

Environmental
Recycling Tech.
PLC

Alfred
Rodlsberger
Nicholas
Stillwell
Upcycle Holding
Ltd

Revocation

Supreme Court
Appeal
Adjourned
Pending EPO
Ruling
Settled

HC10C02090

7

Sandvik Intell.
Prop. AB

Kennametal,
Inc.
Kennametal
Europe Gmbh
Kennametal UK
Ltd.

Infringement

Revoked

HC10C04270

3

Shire Pharma.
Contracts Ltd.

Mount Sinai
Sch. of Med.
of N.Y. Univ.

Revocation

Settled

Notes:
NPEs marked in bold
ʶYear refers to the year in which the lawsuit was initiated (filing of claim form)
* Pending EPO opposition (eventually revoked by EPO)
ˣ Sandisk took a license from SISVEL
NPE types: 1 IP Licensing Company, Acquired Patents; 2 IP Licensing Company, Owned by Inventor; 3 University o
Spin-off; 4 Start-up, Suing Pre-Product; 5 Individual; 6 Industry Consortium; 7 IP Subsidiary of a Product-Producing
Company.
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